A Conundrum Concerning Creation
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Netherlands
2009
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Em: |
Sophia
Ano: 2009, Volume: 48, Número: 1, Páginas: 1-14 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Optimal World
B Omnibenevolence B Best possible world B Moral Obligation B Practical Reason B Consequentialism |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-008-0062-7 |