Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God
This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that t...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2011
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En: |
Sophia
Año: 2011, Volumen: 50, Número: 3, Páginas: 331-344 |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Pascal’s wager
B Prudential rationality B Theoretical rationality B Probability assignments |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Sumario: | This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-010-0213-5 |