Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God

This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Janzen, Greg (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2011
En: Sophia
Año: 2011, Volumen: 50, Número: 3, Páginas: 331-344
Otras palabras clave:B Pascal’s wager
B Prudential rationality
B Theoretical rationality
B Probability assignments
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.
ISSN:1873-930X
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-010-0213-5