Ethical Immunity in Business: A Response to Two Arguments
In this paper I examine the claim that businesspersons have what might be called "ethical immunity" with respect to the duty not to deceive. According to this ethical immunity claim, businesspersons are exempt from the ordinary ethical prohibition against deception; and widespread business...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2002
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In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2002, Volume: 36, Issue: 4, Pages: 337-346 |
Further subjects: | B
Ethical Duty
B Strong Support B Ethical Immunity B Economic Growth B Prudential Ground |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In this paper I examine the claim that businesspersons have what might be called "ethical immunity" with respect to the duty not to deceive. According to this ethical immunity claim, businesspersons are exempt from the ordinary ethical prohibition against deception; and widespread business deception is therefore ethically permissible. I focus on two arguments for the claim. One of the arguments, which has been presented by Albert Carr, relies upon an analogy between business on the one hand, and games in which deception is permitted, on the other. The second argument is based upon the notion that exceptions to ethical duties may sometimes be justified on prudential grounds. In response to the arguments, I try to show that neither one provides strong support for the ethical immunity claim. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1014423802825 |