Social Trust and Auditor Reporting Conservatism
We examine the implications of social trust for auditor reporting conservatism. Using a sample of listed companies in China, we find that clients located in high-trust regions are less likely to receive a non-clean audit opinion. This negative impact of social trust on auditor reporting conservatism...
| Authors: | ; ; ; |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2018
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| Em: |
Journal of business ethics
Ano: 2018, Volume: 153, Número: 4, Páginas: 1083-1108 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
social trust
B Auditor reporting conservatism B Geographic proximity B Personnel rotation B Trust contagion B Monitoramento |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | We examine the implications of social trust for auditor reporting conservatism. Using a sample of listed companies in China, we find that clients located in high-trust regions are less likely to receive a non-clean audit opinion. This negative impact of social trust on auditor reporting conservatism increases (decreases) when the client’s parent firm operates in a region of higher (lower) social trust, suggesting that social trust is contagious from a parent firm to its subsidiaries in a consolidated entity. We provide evidence that the trust contagion is more pronounced for clients with a higher percentage of parent-appointed directors on their boards and clients whose parent firm has fewer subsidiaries. These findings indicate that monitoring and, to a lesser extent, personnel rotation may serve as potential channels of trust contagion. We also find that the impact of trust is more pronounced when the client is located closer to its audit firm, when the client’s parent firm is a state-owned enterprise or holds a higher percentage of the client’s shares, and when the client is associated with greater discretionary accruals. We provide further evidence that it is client rather than auditor trustworthiness that influences auditor reporting conservatism, auditors charge trustworthy clients lower fees, and clients from high-trust regions are less likely to manipulate earnings. Overall, our evidence suggests that social trust alleviates auditor concern about client moral hazard. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-016-3366-5 |