Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fis...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brown, Vivienne (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2006
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2006, Volume: 9, Issue: 3, Pages: 265-288
Further subjects:B Determinism
B Action
B Choice
B Agency
B Alternative possibilities
B Moral Responsibility
B Compatibilism
B comparative decision
B decision to act
B Freedom
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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520 |a Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true. 
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