Agent-based Theories of Right Action
In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permis...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2006
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2006, Τόμος: 9, Τεύχος: 5, Σελίδες: 505-515 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Moral Deliberation
B Moral Evaluation B Right action B Virtues |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-006-9029-3 |