Impartial Reasons, Moral Demands
Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2011
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| Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2011, Volume: 14, Número: 4, Páginas: 457-466 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Irrationality
B Impartiality B Utilitarianism B Demandingness B Moral Obligation B Consequentialism |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | Consequentialism is often charged with demandingness objections which arise in response to the theory’s commitment to impartiality. It might be thought that the only way that consequentialists can avoid such demandingness objections is by dropping their commitment to impartialism. However, I outline and defend a framework within which all reasons for action are impartially grounded, yet which can avoid demandingness objections. I defend this framework against what might appear to be a strong objection, namely the claim that anyone who accepts the theory will be practically irrational. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-010-9256-5 |