Rowlands, Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation
Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2011
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| En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2011, Volumen: 14, Número: 5, Páginas: 569-587 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Justice
B Difference Principle B Reflective Equilibrium B Animals B veil of ignorance B original position B Contractarianism B Experimentation B Benefits principle B Rowlands B Rawls |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments). |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-011-9265-z |