Trustworthiness and Moral Character
Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one’s interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possessi...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2013
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2013, Volumen: 16, Número: 3, Páginas: 543-557 |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Situationism
B Trustworthiness B Elección racional B Hardin B Trust B Moral Character |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Sumario: | Why are people trustworthy? I argue for two theses. First, we cannot explain many socially important forms of trustworthiness solely in terms of the instrumentally rational seeking of one’s interests, in response to external sanctions or rewards. A richer psychology is required. So, second, possession of moral character is a plausible explanation of some socially important instances when people are trustworthy. I defend this conclusion against the influential account of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, given by Russell Hardin, on which most trustworthiness is explained by the interest of continuing relationship. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-012-9373-4 |