Revising Reasons Reactivity: Weakly and Strongly Sufficient Reasons for Acting
In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, wh...
Autore principale: | |
---|---|
Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2014
|
In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2014, Volume: 17, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 529-543 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
Alfred Mele
B John Martin Fischer B Weakness of will B Moral Responsibility B Reasons |
Accesso online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Riepilogo: | In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, where reasons-responsiveness is explained in terms of the mechanism’s regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity. In a review of Fischer and Ravizza’s book Mele contends that their weakly reasons-reactivity condition is inadequate, constructing a case in which, according to their theory, an extreme agoraphobic is morally responsible for his staying in his home. In this paper I modify Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in light of Mele’s problematic example, suggesting a refinement of their weakly reasons-reactivity requirement via a distinction between weakly sufficient reasons and strongly sufficient reasons. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9460-1 |