La crisi della metapsicologia freudiana. - Il: Il paradigma positivista: la psicoanalisi come scienza naturale
Freud's metapsychology, although it is not identical with the whole field of psychoanalytic psychology, originated under the controlling influence of a questionable positivistic model of science. The analysis begun in a previous study (Gregorianum, 61 [1980] 97-136) continues in this study of t...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Italian |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1980
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1980, Volume: 61, Issue: 2, Pages: 275-306 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Freud's metapsychology, although it is not identical with the whole field of psychoanalytic psychology, originated under the controlling influence of a questionable positivistic model of science. The analysis begun in a previous study (Gregorianum, 61 [1980] 97-136) continues in this study of the relationship in Freud's thought between theory and empirical observation. We also treat the attempts by Freud and by the later neopositivist schools of classical ego-theory to articulate psychoanalytic insights about the person in terms taken from neurophysiology, biology, and classical mechanics. Such terms pervade the terminology used to express the metapsychological viewpoints, albeit in disharmonious juxtaposition with more specifically psychological terms. Freud's whole work was affected by his desire to propose psychoanalysis as a natural science on the model of the positivistic outlook of late nineteenth century Viennese physicalism. Opposition arose in the 1950s and 1960s to understanding psychoanalysis as a natural science, especially because of problems of conceptual definition, language, and verification or validation. Orthodox Freudians themselves were troubled by the problem of psychic energy and the discussion finally led to critical doubts about Freud's whole metapsychology. One reason was the dependence on a physical and mechanical model of science and on a neurophysiology no longer tenable. Other frames of reference in the exact sciences were sought, such as cybernetics and information theory, in an attempt to remain to some extent in harmony with the original epistemological ideology. There are those today who remain convinced that psychoanalysis is an exact science, and who in turn reject the different psychologies of understanding and the hermeneutical sciences. In the context of a basic-level discussion, this contribution explores, in their context, the principles of the worldview found at the most theoretical level of metapsychology. Among these, the principle of absolute determinism, in spite of its probable derivation from Spinoza, gives rise to insoluble contradictions in the system between its theoretical affirmations and its clinical assumptions which postulate in the treatment of neuroses a residual freedom of the ego. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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