Gehirnverpflanzung - ethische Implikationen
The possibility of what has been called a brain transplant marks a new stage in the field of medical technology. This advance necessitates that the moral theologian come to a more appropriate understanding of traditional paradigms concerning the transplant issue. Since the crucial problem consists i...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1984
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1984, Volume: 65, Issue: 4, Pages: 695-718 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | The possibility of what has been called a brain transplant marks a new stage in the field of medical technology. This advance necessitates that the moral theologian come to a more appropriate understanding of traditional paradigms concerning the transplant issue. Since the crucial problem consists in the preservation of the recipient's personal identity, the basic elements of the hylomorphic theory with regard to the soul-body relationship have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis is to be put on the role of the brain in guaranteeing the conscious functioning of personal identity, for it is the role of memory to safeguard one's historical continuity. Furthermore, the tools of the moralist need to be critically revised. It should be recalled that the principle of totality has undergone a remarkable evolution in recent years due to increased technical possibilities. This is even true with regard to the broad field of medical therapy. It should be clear that a brain transplant in the strict sense is impossible. Yet, a more feasible procedure would be a head transplant, which could more precisely be designated a body transplant. This procedure would prolong the life of the recipient, whose personal identity, however, is linked to the functioning of his brain. The question might arise as to whether there is proportion between the intended good and the obviously reduced autonomy of the individual after the transplant. The second topic treated here concerns cell transplants. The purpose of this procedure is therapeutic in the strict sense, since it aims at healing Parkinson disease, Mongoloism, etc. Since it necessitates the use of fetal cells, for moral and clinical reasons scientists will have to find other sources of implant material. The possibilities include the producing cells of a person's own adrenal gland, or certain nerve masses of the central nervous system. But the most promising solution seems to rely on pharmacological treatment, which remains within the framework of traditional moral paradigms. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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