Kants antithetisches Problem und Lonergans rationale Auffassung von der Wirklichkeit
The article begins with the letter of 2nd February, 1772, addressed to M. Herz, in which Kant asks how the a priori concepts and principles of the understanding can agree with objects which ontologically transcend the subject. This is the so-called antithetical problem out of which was born the Crit...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1986
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1986, Volume: 67, Issue: 3, Pages: 471-516 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | The article begins with the letter of 2nd February, 1772, addressed to M. Herz, in which Kant asks how the a priori concepts and principles of the understanding can agree with objects which ontologically transcend the subject. This is the so-called antithetical problem out of which was born the Critique of Pure Reason — at least in its core, the transcendental idealism, by means of which Kant eliminates the realistic premise of the very problem. This is the meaning of the principle which underlies transcendental deduction: «The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience». In connection with this principle, the Author presents Lonergan's conception of reality, which he terms «rational conception». By an analysis of our intentionality, Lonergan shows that the conditions of knowing as activity immanent in the subject are at the same time the conditions which cause the transcendence of the same, that is, our capacity for knowing things as they are in themselves. In fact the underlying dynamism which constitutes our knowing has an unlimited range: nothing is disparate to the questions which it asks. Thus Lonergan defines being as the objective of the pure desire to know. Intelligibility is intrinsic to being, in as much as being is correlative to our intelligent and reasonable dynamism. In this way the aporia of Kant is overcome, who indeed recognizes intelligent and reasonable operations but attributes the capacity for attaining the object to the (sensible) intuition alone. The intentionality analysis allows one to determine more precisely that a priori, about which Kant asked himself in what way it could correspond to the objects. A priori, i.e. original endowment of the subject, is the intentionality and its transcendental notions, namely the notions of the intelligible, of the true and real, and of the good, which are qualitatively different modes, according to which our dynamism intends intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly its objective. The agreement of these notions with the real is explained in the same way as the agreement of our cognitional dynamism with the real. A priori is also the triadic structure of our knowing; in this regard the general thesis of the correspondence of intentionality and the real becomes the thesis of isomorphism between the triadic structure of our knowing and the structure of proportionate being. As to the concepts in their true and proper sense, Lonergan does not recognize any categorial a priori. We form our concepts owing to our insights into the data yielded by experience; we come to know that they agree with the real, moving in a critical reflection from concept to judgment, through the absolute position of which we know the real. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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