Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent
The intentional distinction is commonly and rightly recognized as one of the hallmarks of the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent. Raymond Macken, for example, says, “Comme Ton sait, la distinction intentionnelle est une théorie bien caractéristique de Henri de Gand.” He adds that it bears the influence o...
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Cambridge University Press
2006
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| Em: |
Traditio
Ano: 2006, Volume: 61, Páginas: 227-245 |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | The intentional distinction is commonly and rightly recognized as one of the hallmarks of the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent. Raymond Macken, for example, says, “Comme Ton sait, la distinction intentionnelle est une théorie bien caractéristique de Henri de Gand.” He adds that it bears the influence of Avicenna and contributes to the view of John Duns Scotus. On the contrary, he notes, “La distinction réelle est une doctrine tout aussi charactéristique de S. Thomas.” Certainly the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures is characteristic of the metaphysics of St. Thomas, but Henry too has real distinctions in his metaphysics. However, what Henry means by a real distinction is something quite different from what St. Thomas and his followers mean by a real distinction. So too, it is not really helpful to say that Henry considers the intentional distinction “comme une sorte de distinction intermédiaire entre la distinction réelle et la distinction de pure raison,” unless one is clear about what a real distinction and a purely rational distinction are in the thought of the philosopher in question. It is also commonly recognized, as Macken notes, that “Henri, dans ses questions consacrées à cette distinction intentionelle entre l'essence et l'existence, n'attaquait pas en premier lieu Thomas d'Aquin, mais bien Gilles de Rome, ou plutôt, qu'il répondait à ses attaques.” Macken even goes so far as to claim that “la distinction intentionnelle est donc une sorte de distinction réelle,” although he admits that “elle a donc un certain lien avec la distinction de raison.” |
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| ISSN: | 2166-5508 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Traditio
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0362152900002919 |