Fundamental and technical methods of ethics

Consequentialists and deontologists alike tacitly presume that moral decisions should be reached from basic assessments of theoretically set moral value. The presumption they share, I argue, is seriously mistaken. We need to distinguish two general methods of reaching moral decisions, that of the mo...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Magnell, Thomas (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Proquest 1996
Dans: International journal of value-based management
Année: 1996, Volume: 9, Numéro: 1, Pages: 89-100
Sujets non-standardisés:B Decision-making
B Ethics
B moral decision
B Deontology
B fundamental analysis
B Moral Philosophy
B technical analysis
B Values
B moral values
B Consequentialism
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:Consequentialists and deontologists alike tacitly presume that moral decisions should be reached from basic assessments of theoretically set moral value. The presumption they share, I argue, is seriously mistaken. We need to distinguish two general methods of reaching moral decisions, that of the moral fundamentalist and that of the moral technician. Moral fundamentalists and technicians differ in their methods, but not in their aims. The distinction between the two general methods of ethics is particularly important for consequentialism. I maintain that a consequentialist may be without inconsistency a utilitarian fundamentalist and a deontological technician. I suggest that when we pay heed to our epistemic constraints, we have strong consequentialist grounds for adopting this unusual position.
ISSN:1572-8528
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal of value-based management
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF00420510