Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion
This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather t...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Brill
2022
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2022, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, Pages: 361-389 |
Further subjects: | B
voluntariness
B Consent B third-party coercion B Autonomy B Responsibility |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
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520 | |a This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather than the third party’s coercion taken separately, and I will specify the conditions under which consent is invalid. My view, which is a novel version of what I call a Recipient-Focus-View, holds that coercion invalidates consent only if consent was ‘obtained by’ coercion, but not if consent was ‘merely motivated by’ coercion. I explain and support my view on the basis that it best reconciles an unnoticed tension between two fundamental principles in the debate on consent (which I call the Coercion Principle and the Permissibility Principle) and that it can deal with cases that undermine other Recipient-Focus-Views. | ||
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