Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion

This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kiener, Maximilian (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2022
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2022, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, Pages: 361-389
Further subjects:B voluntariness
B Consent
B third-party coercion
B Autonomy
B Responsibility
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