Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion

This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kiener, Maximilian (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2022
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2022, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, Pages: 361-389
Further subjects:B voluntariness
B Consent
B third-party coercion
B Autonomy
B Responsibility
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Summary:This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather than the third party’s coercion taken separately, and I will specify the conditions under which consent is invalid. My view, which is a novel version of what I call a Recipient-Focus-View, holds that coercion invalidates consent only if consent was ‘obtained by’ coercion, but not if consent was ‘merely motivated by’ coercion. I explain and support my view on the basis that it best reconciles an unnoticed tension between two fundamental principles in the debate on consent (which I call the Coercion Principle and the Permissibility Principle) and that it can deal with cases that undermine other Recipient-Focus-Views.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20213548