On the Difficulty of the Evolutionary Debunking of Scientific Realism: Graber and Golemon Buttressed
In their recent article, Graber and Golemon (Sophia 1-18, 2019) argue that any attempted evolutionary debunking of naturalism faces a dilemma. First, in order to be evolutionarily plausible, the skeptical implications must not be too broad. Second, in order to constitute a genuine challenge to scien...
| Authors: | ; |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Springer Netherlands
2022
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 2022, 卷: 61, 发布: 3, Pages: 557-563 |
| Further subjects: | B
Evolutionary debunking
B Naturalism |
| 在线阅读: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | In their recent article, Graber and Golemon (Sophia 1-18, 2019) argue that any attempted evolutionary debunking of naturalism faces a dilemma. First, in order to be evolutionarily plausible, the skeptical implications must not be too broad. Second, in order to constitute a genuine challenge to scientific realism, the skeptical implications must not be too narrow. Graber and Golemon further develop an evolutionary debunking argument that avoids both horns of this dilemma. De Ray (Erkenntnis 1-21, 2020) criticizes Graber and Golemon’s debunking argument then develops his own, competing debunking argument. We first respond to de Ray’s criticisms by showing how Graber and Golemon’s argument can be extended so as to avoid de Ray’s critique. We then show that de Ray’s argument debunking argument is impaled by both horns of Graber and Golemon’s dilemma. The ultimate result will be both a better understanding of the desiderata and the argumentative contours of a successful evolutionary debunking argument. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-021-00856-2 |