For the People, By the Viewpoints? Realism and Idealism in Public Reason
Abstract Since John Rawls, public reason theorists have attempted to show how liberal political norms could be acceptable to people with diverse religious and ethical viewpoints. However, these theories overlook the importance of the distinction between acceptability to realistic people and acceptab...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Brill
2020
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2020, 卷: 17, 发布: 5, Pages: 527-557 |
| Further subjects: | B
Political Liberalism
B Public Justification B Public Reason B Gaus B Rawls |
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| 总结: | Abstract Since John Rawls, public reason theorists have attempted to show how liberal political norms could be acceptable to people with diverse religious and ethical viewpoints. However, these theories overlook the importance of the distinction between acceptability to realistic people and acceptability to viewpoints, which matters because public reason theories are committed to the former, but only deliver the latter, thereby failing to justify liberal norms. Public reason theories therefore face a dilemma: abandon realistic people and lose normative appeal, or retain realism and find a new way to justify liberalism. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20203129 |