Kant, Garve, and the Motives of Moral Action

Abstract Kant's comments `against Garve' constitute his reaction to the latter's remarks on Cicero's De Officiis . Two related criticisms of Kant's against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve's claim that `Kantian morality de...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ludwig, Bernd (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2007
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2007, Volume: 4, Issue: 2, Pages: 183-193
Further subjects:B Kantian ethical theory
B Samuel Clarke
B Christian Garve
B Moral Motivation
B Moral Obligation
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Summary:Abstract Kant's comments `against Garve' constitute his reaction to the latter's remarks on Cicero's De Officiis . Two related criticisms of Kant's against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve's claim that `Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at all'. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be salient for the explanation of human action. I show that Samuel Clarke's analogy of physical explanation in the framework of Newtonianism (in his Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion ) usefully illuminates the difference between Kant and Garve in these respects.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1177/1740468107079251