An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons
According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, wher...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Brill
2019
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| Em: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Ano: 2019, Volume: 16, Número: 2, Páginas: 160-188 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
categorical moral reasons
B Internalism B Externalism B Normative reasons B Practical rationality |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable to do so. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view about normative reasons which involves the same notion of rationality as internalism, at the same time as it is able to account for categorical moral reasons. Thus, it evades the dilemma. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20170009 |