Practical Reason, Value and Action
Abstract How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to lin...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Brill
2007
|
| En: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Año: 2007, Volumen: 4, Número: 3, Páginas: 375-392 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Action
B Intención B Value B Commitment B Practical Reason |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | Abstract How should we decide which theory of practical reason is correct? One possibility is to link each conception of practical reason with a theory of value, and to assess the first in combination with the second. Recently some philosophers have taken a different approach. They have tried to link theories of practical reason with theories of action instead. I try to show that it can be illuminating to think of practical reason in terms of the success conditions of action, but ultimately this is in addition to, rather than a substitute for, relating practical reason to value as well. I set out three different conceptions of action and corresponding success conditions, and explain how each is linked to a particular conception of practical reason and, in two cases, to a theory of value too. My goal is to describe these different accounts, rather than to defend any in particular, though I will suggest that some are more satisfactory than others. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/1740468107083250 |