On Indirectly Self-defeating Moral Theories
Abstract Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Brill
2008
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In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2008, Volume: 5, Issue: 3, Pages: 384-393 |
Further subjects: | B
Utilitarianism
B SELF-DEFEATING B PARFIT B INDIRECT B DISPOSITION |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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520 | |a Abstract Derek Parfit has notably argued that while a moral theory should not be directly self-defeating, there is nothing necessarily wrong with a moral theory that is only indirectly self-defeating. Here I resist this line of argument. I argue instead that indirectly self-defeating moral theories are indeed problematic. Parfit tries to sidestep the oddities of indirectly self-defeating theories by focusing on the choice of dispositions rather than actions. But the very considerations that can make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims if we try to do what the theory recommends can also make it impossible to achieve a theory's aims if we instead try to adopt the dispositions the theory recommends. What makes a theory indirectly self-defeating has little to do with the object of choice, but with the nature of choosing itself. | ||
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