The skeptic, the content externalist, and the theist
Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is tha...
Autore principale: | |
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Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2011
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2011, Volume: 69, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 173-180 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
Theism
B Content externalism B Filosofia della mente B Epistemological skepticism B philosophy of language |
Accesso online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Edizione parallela: | Elettronico
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Riepilogo: | Some philosophers argue that content externalism can provide the foundations of an argument against the traditional epistemological skeptic. I maintain that if such an argument is available, it seems there is also an a priori argument against the possibility of a creationist god. My suspicion is that such a strong consequence is not desirable for the content-externalists, and that the availability of this argument therefore casts doubt on the anti-skeptical position. I argue that all content externalists should be troubled by this result, since even those philosophers who do not endorse the anti-skeptical strategy must either reject the possibility of a creationist god or admit that their thesis does not hold a priori for minds in general. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-010-9261-6 |