Prophets against Ockhamism. Or: why the hard fact/soft fact distinction is irrelevant to the problem of foreknowledge

In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs ab...

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主要作者: van Riel, Raphael (Author)
格式: 电子 文件
语言:English
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出版: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, 卷: 75, 发布: 2, Pages: 119-135
Further subjects:B Hard- and soft facts
B Compatibilism
B Ockhamism
B Incompatibilism
B Divine Foreknowledge
B Freedom
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总结:In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a solution to the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge, it is concluded that Ockhamism fails.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-013-9430-5