The problem of evil: skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis

Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not...

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Autore principale: Sehon, Scott (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
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Pubblicazione: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2010
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2010, Volume: 67, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 67-80
Altre parole chiave:B Theism
B Minatore
B Michael
B problem of evil
B Skeptical theism
B Wykstra
B moral skepticism
B God
B Stephen
B Rea
Accesso online: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Edizione parallela:Elettronico
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Riepilogo:Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not expect to be able to understand God’s ways, and thus we should not regard it as surprising or mysterious that God would allow natural evil. I argue that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis: accepting skeptical theism would undermine our ability to make any moral judgments whatsoever. Second, and more briefly, I argue that skeptical theism would undercut our ability to accept any form of the argument from design, including recent approaches based on fine-tuning.
ISSN:1572-8684
Comprende:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-009-9213-1