The problem of evil: skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis
Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2010, Τόμος: 67, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 67-80 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Theism
B Μεταλλωρύχος B Michael B problem of evil B Skeptical theism B Wykstra B moral skepticism B God B Stephen B Rea |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Παράλληλη έκδοση: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή
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| Σύνοψη: | Natural disasters would seem to constitute evidence against the existence of God, for, on the face of things, it is mysterious why a completely good and all-powerful God would allow the sort of suffering we see from earthquakes, diseases, and the like. The skeptical theist replies that we should not expect to be able to understand God’s ways, and thus we should not regard it as surprising or mysterious that God would allow natural evil. I argue that skeptical theism leads to moral paralysis: accepting skeptical theism would undermine our ability to make any moral judgments whatsoever. Second, and more briefly, I argue that skeptical theism would undercut our ability to accept any form of the argument from design, including recent approaches based on fine-tuning. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-009-9213-1 |