Richard McCormick and Proportionate Reason
In response to criticisms of his "Ambiguity in Moral Choice", Richard McCormick developed, in "Commentary on the Commentaries," an alternative view on proportionate reason. I interpret McCormick's view in terms of what I call "the undermining principle," "the...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1985
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| Em: |
Journal of religious ethics
Ano: 1985, Volume: 13, Número: 2, Páginas: 258-278 |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Não eletrônico
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| Resumo: | In response to criticisms of his "Ambiguity in Moral Choice", Richard McCormick developed, in "Commentary on the Commentaries," an alternative view on proportionate reason. I interpret McCormick's view in terms of what I call "the undermining principle," "the theory of associated goods," "the necessity principle," and "the liberty principle." I argue that the first two are the heart of the theory and link McCormick's view to that of Peter Knauer. I then show that McCormick's view suffers from several problems, including a lack of argumentation for his central undermining principle, and counterexamples to his necessity and liberty principles. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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