Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness
It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2013
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Journal of religious ethics
Έτος: 2013, Τόμος: 41, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 495-512 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Forgiveness
B Resentment B Victims B Reactive attitudes B Norms B wrongdoers |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Παράλληλη έκδοση: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή
|
| Σύνοψη: | It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third-party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12026 |