Circumscribing the space for disruptive emotions within an African communitarian framework
Bernard Matolino has recently argued that African communitarianism is an ethics grounded in emotion aligned with reason. If he is correct, questions arise about what emotions have value within African communitarianism, especially as emotions like anger or resentment could stand in tension with impor...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
2022
|
| In: |
Journal of global ethics
Year: 2022, Volume: 18, Issue: 3, Pages: 386-402 |
| Further subjects: | B
communitarian emotion
B Bernard Matolino B anger and resentment B Reactive attitudes B African communitarianism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Bernard Matolino has recently argued that African communitarianism is an ethics grounded in emotion aligned with reason. If he is correct, questions arise about what emotions have value within African communitarianism, especially as emotions like anger or resentment could stand in tension with important communitarian values, such as social harmony. While little critical attention has so far been paid to such emotions within an African communitarian framework, a wider philosophical literature examining the moral value of disruptive emotions could be drawn on to develop analyses of emotion within African communitarianism. In this paper, I explore how such an analysis could proceed. I argue that drawing on the wider emotion literature, and especially the concept of reactive attitudes introduced by P. F. Strawson, provides an initial case for even disruptive emotions to have value. Even so, we must question whether an analysis of emotion plausibly based on individualistic commitments is compatible with relational communitarian commitments. I nevertheless defend the compatibility and argue that, not only can disruptive emotions have instrumental value through their epistemic and motivational roles in the promotion of community but, importantly, they are partially constitutive of the interpersonal relationships within which we are embedded and that form community. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1744-9634 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of global ethics
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2021.2021274 |