Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness
It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument...
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2013
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| In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Anno: 2013, Volume: 41, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 495-512 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Forgiveness
B Resentment B Victims B Reactive attitudes B Norms B wrongdoers |
| Accesso online: |
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| Edizione parallela: | Elettronico
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| Riepilogo: | It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third-party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12026 |