Ockham über die Seele und ihre Teile
Ockham affirms that a human being consists of three really distinct forms that exist in matter, thus defending a «pluralist» position in the debate about the soul. However, he takes a «unitarist» position with regard to the rational soul, claiming that intellect and will are not really distinct. Why...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | German |
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Published: |
Peeters
2010
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In: |
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Year: 2010, Volume: 77, Issue: 2, Pages: 313-350 |
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Summary: | Ockham affirms that a human being consists of three really distinct forms that exist in matter, thus defending a «pluralist» position in the debate about the soul. However, he takes a «unitarist» position with regard to the rational soul, claiming that intellect and will are not really distinct. Why does he not admit a plurality of forms in the rational soul as well? And why does he think that the rational soul as a whole is really distinct from the sensory soul? This paper examines these questions, thus analyzing Ockham’s metaphysics of the soul. It pays close attention to his arguments both for a plurality of forms and for the unity of the rational soul. It argues that Ockham carefully distinguishes between forms that are metaphysical parts of a human being, and faculties that are ways of acting of a specific form. This distinction enables him to reject both a radical unitarism that accepts one single form in a human being, and an excessive pluralism that posits as many forms as there are faculties.\n4207 \n4207 |
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ISSN: | 1783-1717 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.77.2.2062481 |