Plausibilität des Glaubens: Wie finden wir das?
The present article deals with ways of handling the experience of cognitive uncertainty. For this purpose, two preliminary assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that theories, propositions, and behaviors are deemed plausible if they merit our approval. Second, the issue of the plausibility of b...
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Немецкий |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht
2023
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| В: |
Kerygma und Dogma
Год: 2023, Том: 69, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 38-57 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
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| Индексация IxTheo: | NAB Фундаментальное богословие |
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| Итог: | The present article deals with ways of handling the experience of cognitive uncertainty. For this purpose, two preliminary assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that theories, propositions, and behaviors are deemed plausible if they merit our approval. Second, the issue of the plausibility of beliefs that we entertain seems to presuppose that their contents can be questioned and that plausibility can be lost. This observation leads to a closer phenomenological analysis of the behavior of questioning and to a definition of the concept of doubt, understood as cognitive uncertainty. This is followed by an interpretation of Charles Peirce’s famous essay The Fixation of Belief, in which he develops four ways (or methods) of dealing with the experience of cognitive uncertainty. I propose that, in the best case, these methods interact, but that the fourth method, which Peirce calls the "method of science", alone is able to account for the social ambiguity of experience without abandoning its critical tools. This view is also highly significant with regard to the theory of religion. |
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| ISSN: | 2196-8020 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Kerygma und Dogma
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.13109/kedo.2023.69.1.38 |