Maternal autonomy and prenatal harm
This paper offers an account of why prenatal harms seem particularly objectionable. It identifies structural similarities between key cases of prenatal harm and the recently characterized “all-or-nothing” problem from Joe Horton. According to the account defended by the paper, a willingness to paren...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2023
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2023, Volume: 37, Issue: 3, Pages: 246-255 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCB Personal ethics NCH Medical ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
maternal autonomy
B prenatal harm B all-or-nothing problem B Abortion |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This paper offers an account of why prenatal harms seem particularly objectionable. It identifies structural similarities between key cases of prenatal harm and the recently characterized “all-or-nothing” problem from Joe Horton. According to the account defended by the paper, a willingness to parent incurs a duty to protect the fetus from harm. This implication provides independent support for so-called “voluntarist” or “intentionalist” accounts of parental role obligations, according to which, roughly, a mother's autonomous choice to parent a child suffices for having the obligations distinctive of parenthood toward the child. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13131 |