The right to a second opinion on Artificial Intelligence diagnosis—Remedying the inadequacy of a risk-based regulation
In this paper, we argue that patients who are subjects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-supported diagnosis and treatment planning should have a right to a second opinion, but also that this right should not necessarily be construed as a right to a physician opinion. The right to a second opinion cou...
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | ; |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2023
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Στο/Στη: |
Bioethics
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 37, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 303-311 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCH Ιατρική Ηθική NCJ Επιστημονική Ηθική ΧΑ Δίκαιο |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
AI regulation
B AI rights B Artificial Intelligence B second opinion B AI risks |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Σύνοψη: | In this paper, we argue that patients who are subjects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-supported diagnosis and treatment planning should have a right to a second opinion, but also that this right should not necessarily be construed as a right to a physician opinion. The right to a second opinion could potentially be satisfied by another independent AI system. Our considerations on the right to second opinion are embedded in the wider debate on different approaches to the regulation of AI, and we conclude the article by providing a number of reasons for preferring a rights-based approach over a risk-based approach. |
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ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13124 |