Dignity and the Founding Myth of Bioethics
In this article, I reject the “principlism” of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and argue that respect for autonomy is, and ought to be, the fundamental value of bioethics. To do so, I offer a reconstruction of what I call the field's “founding myth,” a genealogy that affords primacy to the ri...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Wiley
2023
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В: |
The Hastings Center report
Год: 2023, Том: 53, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 26-35 |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Dignity
B principlism B Bioethics B four principles B Autonomy B Kant |
Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Итог: | In this article, I reject the “principlism” of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and argue that respect for autonomy is, and ought to be, the fundamental value of bioethics. To do so, I offer a reconstruction of what I call the field's “founding myth,” a genealogy that affords primacy to the right to be respected as a human being with dignity. Next, I examine the relationship between this basic right and a derivative right of autonomy. I suggest that principlism has promulgated an uncharitable understanding of respect for autonomy, one that ensures that the principle cannot occupy the central position I claim for it. Finally, I sketch a more plausible understanding of respect for autonomy and explore its implications. |
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ISSN: | 1552-146X |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Hastings Center, The Hastings Center report
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1002/hast.1471 |