Vices, Virtues, and Dispositions
In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about the nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously the claim that virtues (and certain flavours of vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed by agents, and secondly, by employing a plural...
| Authors: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain
2023
|
| Em: |
TheoLogica
Ano: 2023, Volume: 7, Número: 2, Páginas: 1-24 |
| Classificações IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofia |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Vice pluralism
B Moral Progress B Vices B Dispositions B Virtue Ethics |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Resumo: | In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about the nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously the claim that virtues (and certain flavours of vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed by agents, and secondly, by employing a pluralistic attitude borrowed from Battaly’s pluralism (2008). Through these lenses, we identify three varieties of viciousness: incontinence, indifference, and malevolence. The upshot is that the notion of vice is not as categorically homogeneous as that of virtue: some states of viciousness consist in interference of present virtuous dispositions, or mimicking of absent vicious ones, whereas others can be considered genuine dispositions themselves. Furthermore, this set-up can provide an interesting, albeit highly idealized story as to how, through the interference in one’s environment, one gets acquainted with vice in various degrees. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-à-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct. Finally, this approach can be illuminating vis-a-vis Virtue Ethics in general; e.g. we can employ it to discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection to Hursthouse’s (1999) account of moral conduct. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v7i2.67873 |