God's Involvement in Creaturely Action: Physical Premotion, Aristotelian Premotion, or a Dimension of Creation-Conservation?
The question of how two agents—creaturely and divine—can bring about one action has been a theological conundrum for ages. This article explores Thomas Aquinas's view on God's involvement in creaturely action by looking specifically at his doctrine of divine application. What sort of actio...
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Thomist Press
2024
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| In: |
The Thomist
Jahr: 2024, Band: 88, Heft: 1, Seiten: 1-39 |
| IxTheo Notationen: | KAE Kirchengeschichte 900-1300; Hochmittelalter KAJ Kirchengeschichte 1914-; neueste Zeit NBC Gotteslehre NBD Schöpfungslehre TB Altertum VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Bernard Lonergan
B physical premotion (praemotio physica) B divine application B Thomas Aquinas B Robert Matava B Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange B Aristotelian premotion B primary and secondary causation |
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| Zusammenfassung: | The question of how two agents—creaturely and divine—can bring about one action has been a theological conundrum for ages. This article explores Thomas Aquinas's view on God's involvement in creaturely action by looking specifically at his doctrine of divine application. What sort of action does God perform in creaturely action? After establishing a textual basis for a discussion of God's action in creaturely action in Aquinas, the article discusses and evaluates three interpretations: (1) Robert Matava's recent interpretation of divine application in terms of creation-conservation; (2) Reginald Garrigou-Langrange's traditional interpretation in terms of physical premotion (praemotio physica); and (3) Bernard Lonergan's interpretation in terms of Aristotelian premotion. The article then delineates the differences in the metaphysics of creaturely action. It argues that Aristotelian physical premotion provides a substantive alternative to the traditional account of physical premotion—an alternative that holds that divine application is motion and therefore does not reduce the divina applicatio to a dimension of creation-conservation. |
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| ISSN: | 2473-3725 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: The Thomist
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