Commitment and reflection in moral life

On the view that Nicholas Adams advocates in ‘Alternatives to Moral Common Ground’, ethics is complicit in undermining the commitments that constitute our moral lives, because by forcing us to articulate those commitments they lose their hold on us. In this paper I take Adams’ views as a starting po...

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Κύριος συγγραφέας: Compaijen, Rob (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
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Έκδοση: Taylor & Francis 2023
Στο/Στη: International journal of philosophy and theology
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 84, Τεύχος: 5, Σελίδες: 340-346
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B Articulation
B Nicholas Adams
B Bernard Williams
B Reflection
B Commitment
B Christine Korsgaard
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:On the view that Nicholas Adams advocates in ‘Alternatives to Moral Common Ground’, ethics is complicit in undermining the commitments that constitute our moral lives, because by forcing us to articulate those commitments they lose their hold on us. In this paper I take Adams’ views as a starting point to explore the idea that ethics might be complicit in undermining our moral lives. Aiming to shed light on the relation between reflection and commitment, I will do two things. First, I try to explain why ethics, as a reflective enterprise, undermines the unspoken hold our commitments have on us. Second, I will explore the idea that reflection is destructive in the sense that it falsifies our pre-reflective commitments.
ISSN:2169-2335
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2023.2293992