Valuing humanity: Kierkegaardian worries about Korsgaardian transcendental arguments

This paper draws out from Kierkegaard's work a distinctive critical perspective on an influential contemporary approach in moral philosophy: namely, Christine Korsgaard's transcendental argument for the value of humanity. From Kierkegaard's perspective, we argue, Korsgaard argument go...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Stern, Robert 1962- (Auteur) ; Watts, Daniel ca. 20./21. Jh. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Taylor & Francis [2019]
Dans: International journal of philosophy and theology
Année: 2019, Volume: 80, Numéro: 4/5, Pages: 424-442
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Korsgaard, Christine M. 1952- / Kierkegaard, Søren 1813-1855 / Éthique / Valeur
Classifications IxTheo:NCA Éthique
TJ Époque moderne
TK Époque contemporaine
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B absolute vs relative value
B transcendental arguments
B Søren Kierkegaard
B Moral Scepticism
B Christine Korsgaard
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Résumé:This paper draws out from Kierkegaard's work a distinctive critical perspective on an influential contemporary approach in moral philosophy: namely, Christine Korsgaard's transcendental argument for the value of humanity. From Kierkegaard's perspective, we argue, Korsgaard argument goes too far, in attributing absolute value to humanity - but also that she is required to make this claim if her transcendental argument is to work. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, to place this sort of value in humanity is problematic since it threatens to make the relation between individuals too claustrophobic. Finally, we explore the possibility of a rival approach, in which we should view others as ethically significant because they too are related to the kind of ‘third' which Kierkegaard argues is needed to bring stability to the structure of the self. In this way, we claim, a different and more successful transcendental argument to the value of humanity can be found in the work of Kierkegaard.
ISSN:2169-2335
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1586568