Transworld depravity and divine omniscience
This paper argues against the sufficiency of Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, as presented in God, freedom, and evil as a response to the logical problem of evil. I begin by introducing the fundamental issues present in the problem of evil and proceed to present Plantinga's response. N...
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2015
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, 卷: 77, 發布: 3, Pages: 205-218 |
| Further subjects: | B
Free Will
B FREE will & determinism B Omniscience B Evil B God Omniscience B GOOD & evil B Plantinga, Alvin B Will B Plantinga B Transworld depravity |
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Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 總結: | This paper argues against the sufficiency of Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, as presented in God, freedom, and evil as a response to the logical problem of evil. I begin by introducing the fundamental issues present in the problem of evil and proceed to present Plantinga's response. Next, I argue that, despite the argument's wide acceptance in the field, a central notion to the defense, transworld depravity, is internally inconsistent and that attempts to resolve the problem would result in an abandonment of the original terms of the discussion. Finally, I consider some potential alternatives for a free will defense beyond the one presented by Plantinga and conclude that the logical problem of evil may have more worth as a philosophical topic than has been thought in recent years. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9499-5 |