Counterfactuals of divine freedom
Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom ( CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God's will. As a result, I argue th...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 79, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 185-205 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Molinism
B Deliberation B Jesus Christ Divinity B Divine Freedom B Libertarianism B COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic) B MOLINA, Luis de, 1535-1600 B Counterfactuals of freedom B FLINT, Thomas B Middle Knowledge |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom ( CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God's will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9542-1 |