Self-Representation & Good Determination
I argue that a distinction made in recent literature in the philosophy of mind between self-organizing and self-governing systems can serve as the basis of a principled distinction between good and bad determination on the part of the compatibilist with respect to freedom or control. I first con...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2015, Volumen: 18, Número: 1, Páginas: 113-122 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Agential control
Compatibilism
Moral responsibility
Self-representation
Manipulation arguments
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| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Sumario: | I argue that a distinction made in recent literature in the philosophy of mind between self-organizing and self-governing systems can serve as the basis of a principled distinction between good and bad determination on the part of the compatibilist with respect to freedom or control. I first consider two arguments for the claim that causal determinism undermines control: the Consequence Argument as presented by Peter van Inwagen, and the Four Case Argument of Derk Pereboom. I then elucidate the difference between a self-organizing and self-governing system, and argue that the capacity for self-representation that is constitutive of the latter allows for agential control. This difference, I argue, can provide the basis of a principled distinction between good and bad determination. I subsequently show how the framework presented undermines the Consequence and Four Case Arguments in their attempt to establish the claim that causal determinism undermines control, and I discuss the application of this framework to manipulation arguments in general. Finally, I consider and respond to Galen Strawsons Basic Argument and the general rejoinder to my account that one is not responsible for the particular way in which one exercises ones capacity for self-representation, and that this undermines any claim to agential control and responsibility. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9512-1 |