Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance
Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to t...
| Autori: | ; |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2017, Volume: 20, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 361-374 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCA Etica VA Filosofia VB Ermeneutica; Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Guidance
B Objectivism B Ought B Perspectivism B Motivating reasons B Normative reasons |
| Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to f only if you are able to f for the reasons which determine that you ought to f. We show that this premise can be understood in different ways. On one reading, it provides no support for perspectivism. On another reading, the premise lacks support. So, the argument fails. An important upshot of the paper is that the objectivist can embrace the thought about guidance. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9775-9 |