In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sharadin, Nathaniel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2017, Volume: 20, Issue: 2, Pages: 375-392
IxTheo Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Humor
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3