In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

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1. VerfasserIn: Sharadin, Nathaniel (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2017, Band: 20, Heft: 2, Seiten: 375-392
IxTheo Notationen:NCA Ethik
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Humor
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
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Zusammenfassung:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Enthält:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3