In Defense of Comic Pluralism
Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. Whats the relationship between a jokes being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 20, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 375-392 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Χιούμορ (μοτίβο)
B Aesthetic judgment B Comic moralism B Incongruity theory B Comic immoralism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. Whats the relationship between a jokes being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3 |