In Defense of Comic Pluralism
Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. Whats the relationship between a jokes being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2017, Volumen: 20, Número: 2, Páginas: 375-392 |
Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofía |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism B Humor B Incongruity theory B Comic immoralism |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Sumario: | Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. Whats the relationship between a jokes being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3 |