In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

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Autor principal: Sharadin, Nathaniel (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Publicado: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
En: Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2017, Volumen: 20, Número: 2, Páginas: 375-392
Clasificaciones IxTheo:NCA Ética
VA Filosofía
Otras palabras clave:B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Humor
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
Acceso en línea: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descripción
Sumario:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3