In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

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Autore principale: Sharadin, Nathaniel (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
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Pubblicazione: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2017, Volume: 20, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 375-392
Notazioni IxTheo:NCA Etica
VA Filosofia
Altre parole chiave:B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Umorismo
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
Accesso online: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descrizione
Riepilogo:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Comprende:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3