In Defense of Comic Pluralism
Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. Whats the relationship between a jokes being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2017, Volume: 20, Número: 2, Páginas: 375-392 |
Classificações IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofia |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism B Humor B Incongruity theory B Comic immoralism |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Resumo: | Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. Whats the relationship between a jokes being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3 |