In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:  
Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Sharadin, Nathaniel (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Carregar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado em: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
Em: Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2017, Volume: 20, Número: 2, Páginas: 375-392
Classificações IxTheo:NCA Ética
VA Filosofia
Outras palavras-chave:B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Humor
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
Acesso em linha: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descrição
Resumo:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3